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The Uniform Gifts to Minors Act:
A Patent Ambiguity
Margaret M. Mahoney*
I. INTRODUCTON
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted the
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA). The Act provides an easy
and effective means of transferring property to minors. The trans-
feror designates an adult custodian to receive and manage the
property, in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The custo-
dial relationship created is a unique relationship with regard to
property, distinct from all other fiduciary arrangements. A serious
inconsistency in the provisions of the Act that define this relation-
ship is the subject of this Article.
One section of the Uniform Act provides that once the trans-
fer has taken place only the minor has any legal or beneficial inter-
est in the custodial property. Another section authorizes the custo-
dian to use the fund for the support of the minor. When the fund
is applied for the minor's support, a clear benefit redounds to the
parent who owes a duty of support to the minor. To the extent
that this application of custodial funds satisfies the parental sup-
port duty, a person other than the minor effectively derives a bene-
ficial interest from the custodial property. The two provisions are
thus inconsistent, creating an ambiguity in the Act regarding the
custodian's authority to use the fund in satisfaction of parental
support duties.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. B.A., 1970, LeMoyne College;
J.D., 1974, University of Michigan. I wish to thank my colleague, Professor William J.
Brown, for his valuable assistance in the preparation of this Article. I am grateful for the
research assistance provided by Alexandra Matthews, J.D., 1980, and Susan Fiss, J.D., 1981,
the University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
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The ambiguity has provoked litigation in situations in which
the resolution of other legal issues turns upon the existence or non-
existence of a parent's beneficial interest in the custodial fund. For
example, some states allow spousal claims under elective share
statutes against property held in custodianship for a decedent's
minor child only if the fund was available to discharge the dece-
dent's support duties. Because of the ambiguity, both the surviving
spouse and the party resisting the spouse's claim currently find
support in the Act for their conflicting positions on this matter. In
the area of federal taxation of uniform gifts, various tax conse-
quences depend upon the existence of a power in the custodian to
use the fund for the minor donee's support. Current tax laws rec-
ognize this custodial power for some purposes and expressly deny
it for other purposes in a manner that generates maximum
revenue.
The ambiguity in the provisions of the UGMA is a critical
shortcoming in this widely used estate planning device. Resolving
the ambiguity by modifying one of the inconsistent provisions is
desirable. The resulting uniform definition of the custodian's pow-
ers and of the interests created under the Act would avoid future
litigation based on the existing inconsistent definitions. In addi-
tion, the proposed clarification would introduce an element of in-
tegrity to the federal tax treatment of uniform gifts.
11. THE AMBIGUITY IN THE UGMA
The Model Gifts of Securities to Minors Act, which was spon-
sored by the New York Stock Exchange and the Association of
Stock Exchange Firms, was enacted by thirteen states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia in 1955 and 1956.1 The Model Act attempted to
meet the perceived need for a simple method of making gifts of
securities to minors. In 1956, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Gifts to Mi-
nors Act, which "follow[s] the Model Act in every material respect
but incorporate[s] some variations in detail."'2 The Uniform Act
1. Commissioners' Prefatory Note to ihe 1956 Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, 8 UNm-
FORM LAWS ANNOTATED 225 (1972).
2. Id. The Commissioners' Note, id. at 227, summarizes several changes made by the
1956 Uniform Act: The Uniform Act broadened the scope of the Model Act by allowing gifts
of money as well as securities. While the Model Act limited the donor's choice of custodian
to the donor, an adult member of the minor's family, or the guardian of the minor, the
Uniform Act permitted any adult person to be named as custodian. In addition, the Uni-
form Act added banks with trust powers to the list of eligible custodians. None of these
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has been revised twice-in 1965 and 1966.3 Each of the fifty states
and the District of Columbia have enacted some version of the
Uniform Act.4
Under both the Model Act and the Uniform Act a transfer
made to a qualified custodian for the designated minor automati-
cally incorporates the provisions of the Act as the terms of the gift.
Those provisions include the irrevocable vesting of legal and equi-
table title in the minor,5 broad management powers in the custo-
dian,' wide custodial discretion regarding the retention or distribu-
tion of property and income during the period of the
custodianship, and mandatory distribution of principal and in-
changes affect the analysis in this Article of the relationships created by the custodial
arrangement.
3. The 1966 Revised Act permits gifts of securities, money, life insurance policies, and
annuity contracts.
4. ALA. CODE §§ 35-5-1 to -10 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.60.011-.101 (1962 & Supp.
1979); Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-2071 to -2077 (1967 & Supp. 1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§
50-901 to -925 (1971); CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1154-1165 (West 1954 & Supp. 1980); COLO. REv.
STAT. §§ 11-50-101 to -112 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-101 to -109b (West 1958 &
Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4501-4510 (1979); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. §§ 21-301 to
-311 (West 1967 & Supp. 1970); FA. STAT. ANN. §§ 710.01-.10 (West 1969 & Supp. 1980);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-301 to -313 (1979); HAwII Rzv. STAT. §§ 553-1 to -9 (1976); IDAHo
CODE §§ 68-801 to -810 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 V, §§ 201-211 (Smith-Hurd 1978);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 30-2-8-1 to -10 (Burns 1972 & Supp. 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 565A.1-
.11 (West 1950 & Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-901 to -911 (1973 & Supp. 1979); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 385.011-.200 (Baldwin 1978); LA. Rzv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:735-:742 (West
1965 & Supp. 1980); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 1001-1010 (1964 & Supp. 1980); MD.
EST. & ThusTs CODE ANN. §§ 13-301 to -310 (1974 & Supp. 1980); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
201A, §§ 1-11 (West 1958 & Supp. 1980); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 554.451-.461 (1967 &
Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 527.01-.11 (West 1975); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 91-19-1 to -19
(1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 404.010-.100 (Vernon 1979); MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-26-101 to -
404 (1979); Na. REv. STAT. §§ 38-1001 to -1010 (1978); NEV. Rzv. STAT. §§ 167.010-.110
(1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 463-A:1 to :10 (1968 & Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:38-
13 to -41 (West Supp. 1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-7-1 to -10 (1978); N.Y. EST., POWERS &
TRusTS LAW §§ 7-4.1 to .12 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1980-1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 33-68
to -77 (1975 & Supp. 1979); N.D. CEw. CODE §§ 47-24-01 to -10 (1978); Omo Rxv. CODE
ANN. §§ 1339.31-.39 (Anderson 1979); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, §§ 401-410, 415-418 (1971 & Supp.
1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 126.805-.880 (1979); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5301-5310 (Purdon
1974 & Supp. 1980); R.L GEN. LAwS §§ 18-7-1 to -11 (1969); S.C. CODE §§ 35-3-10 to -120
(1977 & Supp. 1979); S.D. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 55-10-1 to -39 (1967 & Supp. 1979); TzNN.
CODE ANN. §§ 35-801 to -810 (1977); TX. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 5923-101 (Vernon 1962
& Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-601 to -609 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 14, §§ 3201-
3209 (1974 & Supp. 1980); VA. CODE §§ 31-26 to -36 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
21.24.010-.900 (1978); W. VA. CODE §§ 36-7-1 to -11 (1966 & Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
880.61-.71 (West 1958 & Supp. 1980-1981); Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-13-101 to -110 (1977).
5. 1966 Rvisan UNIFORM Girs To MINORS AcT § 3(a) [hereinafter cited as UGMA].
All subsequent references to the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act are to provisions of the 1966
Revised Act unless otherwise indicated.
6. Id. § 4(e).
7. Id. § 4(b).
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come to the minor upon the minor's twenty-first birthday (or to
the minor's estate in the event of death).8 Provisions waiving the
requirements of a fiduciary's bond,9 mandatory accountings,10 and
compensation for the custodian further simplify the fiduciary re-
lationship. Additionally, third parties are encouraged to enter into
transactions involving custodial property by provisions relieving
them of the duty to determine the actual authority of the person
who purports to act as the property's custodian. 2
An inconsistency exists within the provisions of both the
Model and Uniform Acts. On the one hand, each clearly states that
a transfer under the Act vests the property absolutely in the minor
donee. Section 3(a) of the Uniform Act provides, "A gift made in a
manner prescribed in this act is irrevocable and conveys to the mi-
nor indefeasibly vested legal title to the [property] given." On the
other hand, section 4(b) of the Uniform Act, setting out the custo-
dian's distributive powers, provides that,
The custodian shall pay over to the minor for expenditure by him, or
expend for the minor's benefit, so much or all the custodial property as the
custodian deems advisable for the support, maintenance, education and ben-
efit of the minor in the manner, at the time or times, and to the extent that
the custodian in his discretion deems suitable and proper, with or without
court order, with or without regard to the duty of himself or of any other
person to support the minor or his ability to do so, and with or without
regard to any other income or property of the minor which may be applicable
or available for any such purpose.1'
Sections 3(a) and 4(b) are inconsistent to the extent that sec-
tion 4(b) authorizes the use of the fund to reduce the obligation of
support imposed by law upon the minor's parents.14 This use in-
8. Id. § 4(d).
9. Id. § 5(d).
10. Id. § 8.
11. Id. § 5(c).
12. Id. §6.
13. Id. § 4(b) (emphasis added).
14. In every American jurisdiction, the law imposes upon parents a duty to support
their minor children. H. CLARK, Tim LAW o DoMEsTic RRLATIONS IN THE UNIrzD STATES §
15.1, at 488 (1968). Until fairly recently, the obligation was viewed as primarily a duty of the
father and only secondarily a duty of the mother. Id. §§ 6.2, 15.1, at 187-88, 488-89. Statutes
and case law in a number of jurisdictions now impose the duty equally upon both parents.
E.g., Weiner, Child Support: The Double Standard, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. Rzv. 1317, 1324-25
(1978); see, e.g., Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 36-
828 (Supp. 1980). The law provides the means of enforcing the duty against parents. Stat-
utes authorize the court ordering a decree of divorce to rule as well on the matter of child
support. See, e.g., Divorce Code, Act No. 1980-26, 1980 Pa. Laws § 301(a)(3). In addition,
statutes commonly authorize a representative of the child to bring a civil proceeding for
support against the parent, outside of the divorce context. See, e.g., 62 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.
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creases the parents' net worth by the amount that they would owe
for support but for the custodian's distributions. Correspondingly,
the net worth of the. minor decreases by the same amount. This
result contradicts the section 3(a) provision that the fund belongs
to the minor donee.
A. The Proper Construction of Section 4(b)
An important threshold question, then, is whether the lan-
guage of section 4(b) authorizes the custodian to use the fund to
discharge support obligations owed by others to the minor. Read
literally, the statement that "[t]he custodian shall pay over.., for
the support . . .of the minor ... in his discretion . ..with or
without regard to the duty of himself or of any other person to
support the minor or his ability to do so," seems to confer upon
the custodian authority to discharge support obligations. This lit-
eral meaning of the language of section 4(b) conflicts with the sec-
tion 3(a) provision that the minor alone has an interest in the
property.
It is possible to construe section 4(b) in a manner consonant
with the vesting provision. As suggested by one writer,
The fact that the custodian is given the power to use the child's property
for the child's benefit "without regard to the duty of himself or of any other
person to support the minor" does not mean that the custodian can discharge
the parent's obligation ....
A parent or other custodian of a child's property who used the child's
funds to pay the parent's bills would not thereby have discharged his obliga-
tion. He would have paid the bills but he would, in effect, have embezzled the
child's funds and be responsible to him for reimbursement. The same would
be true of a guardian who used the child's funds to pay the parent's bills.
It is submitted that the same rule applies under the custodian statutes.
It is one thing to give the custodian power to expend the child's funds so that
the child is not left in need or in want because the parent fails in his duty,
but quite another thing to say that the custodian has been given the power to
relieve the parent's obligation out of property unequivocally vested in the
child.'5
In In re Marriage of Wolfert,16 the Colorado Court of Appeals
concluded that property transferred by a father to his children
under the UGMA prior to the parents' divorce could not be subse-
§ 1973 (Purdon 1968). Criminal sanctions exist for the punishment of those who violate the
duty. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4321 (Purdon 1973). State agencies that assume
the burden of support when parents default are authorized to seek reimbursement from the
parents. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1974 (Purdon 1968).
15. Tenney, Using the Custodian Statute as a Planning Device, 16 N.Y.U. INsT. FED.
TAx. 937, 951-52 (1958) (footnotes omitted).
16. 42 Colo. App. 433, 598 P.2d 524 (1979).
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quently used to reduce his support obligation. In imposing this re-
striction on the use of the funds, the court construed the language
of section 4(b) in a manner similar to. that suggested above. The
court stated that,
[T]he intent of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act is to allow custodians to
disburse funds whether or not the children are adequately supported. The
section does nothing to relieve a parent of the separate duty to support the
children, nor does it authorize the custodian to disburse the funds as a means
of fulfilling the parent's obligation to support. This interpretation is unavoid-
able in light of the fact that the gift is irrevocable and gives the children an
"indefeasibly vested legal title" to the gift.17
The court distinguished between the permitted use of the
fund for support needs and impermissible attempts to use the fund
to relieve parental obligations. The distinction is more easily
drawn in the context of the separated family when a court order
has fixed the amount of the support obligation. In this situation,
the amount owed under the order will not be reduced by virtue of
the disbursement of the fund for the child's support needs.18
In the ongoing family, however, the Wolfert distinction is diffi-
cult to maintain. The value of the support obligation will not have
been fixed. With any disbursement by the custodian, therefore, it
may be unclear whether the disbursement supplements or replaces
the parents' support payments. Only disbursements in place of
support payments are at issue here. In the case of a disbursement
actually used for the child's support, the effect will be a reduction
of the parental support obligation unless the custodian seeks reim-
bursement from the parent. When the custodian is also the parent,
reimbursement is unlikely.
Thus, the strained reading that reconciles section 4(b) with
section 3(a) makes a distinction that, in the setting of an ongoing
family, may well be unworkable. The literal and workable con-
struction of the language in section 4(b), a construction recognizing
an interest in the person owing a duty to support the minor, ren-
ders it contrary to the interest of the minor defined in section 3(a).
At first glance, UGMA section 4(i) promises to shed some light
on the custodian's powers generally, including the power to use the
fund for support. The section provides that "A custodian has [and
holds as powers in trust], with respect to the custodial property, in
17. Id. at , 598 P.2d at 526.
18. In Wolfert the court affirmed the trial court's order that the fund be used only for
the children's extraordinary needs. Id. at .. , 598 P.2d at 526. Its discussion of the effect of
a potential disbursement for support upon the support duty, therefore, is dictum.
[Vol. 34:495500
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addition to the rights and powers provided in this act, all the
rights and powers which a guardian has with respect to property
not held as custodial property."1' The Commissioners' Note follow-
ing the section states, "If the statutes or decisions of the enacting
State give recognition to powers in trust, the bracketed language
relating thereto should be included to define the legal status of the
custodian in the light of existing law. °2 0 The greatest development
of the power in trust concept has occurred in New York State, al-
though a number of other jurisdictions recognize the concept as
well.2 1 A power in trust is defined as "an authority to do any act
relating to property for the benefit of a person or persons other
than the holder of the power, which the person granting or reserv-
ing the power might lawfully perform himself.' 22 Because of the
trust aspect of the power in trust relationship, the donee of the
power is held to strict standards of fiduciary conduct. Generally,
the fiduciary must use property for the exclusive benefit of the
named beneficiary. This general rule, standing alone, would go far
to define the powers of UGMA custodians. It has been noted, how-
ever, that
the statute does excuse the custodian of much liability which might otherwise
be incurred by a donee of a power in trust. The statute excuses the noncom-
pensated custodian from all liability for loss of the property except loss due
to bad faith, intentional wrongdoing, or imprudent investment. Thus the
statute attempts to place the custodian in the familiar conceptual setting of a
donee of a power in trust, with clearly marked boundaries, only to provide
later in the very same section of the act a modification which defeats the
purpose for which the power-in-trust clause was included. As a result, the
... courts have a new concept, the boundaries of which will have to be
formed in ensuing litigationla
Thus, the power in trust language" does nothing to clarify the cus-
todian's authority to use the fund to benefit anyone other than the
minor donee.
Another provision of the UGMA that deals expressly with the
use of the custodial fund for the support of the minor is section
19. UGMA § 4(i).
20. 8 UNiFORM LAwS ANNOTATED 207 (1972).
21. See Note, The Indiana Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, 33 IND. L.J. 242, 256 n.78(1958).
22. Sutcomm-rx ON THE UNrFORM Gn's To MiNORs AcT, REPORT, reprinted in 108
TRusTs & EST. 983, 984 (1964).
23. 32 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 203, 209 (1957) (footnotes omitted).
24. According to the notes following § 4(i) regarding Action in Adopting Jurisdictions,
all but thirteen states have enacted the power in trust language. 8 UNvoRm LAws ANNO-
TATED 208-11 (1972).
1981]
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4(c). That section states,
The court, on the petition of a parent or guardian of the minor or of the
minor, if he has attained the age of fourteen years, may order the custodian
to pay over to the minor for expenditure by him or to expend so much or all
the custodial property as is necessary for the minor's support, maintenance
or education.
2 5
No reported case involves a petition under section 4(c).2 The
Commissioners' Note following section 4 of the 1966 Revised Act
states that, "[s]ubsection (c) makes clear the enforceable duty of
the custodian to expend income or principal when necessary for
the support, maintenance or education of the minor. ' 7 The most
obvious meaning of the language empowers the court to order pay-
ments by the custodian upon the petition of a designated person
only in limited circumstances. A finding must be made that the
distribution is "necessary for the support, maintenance or educa-
tion of the minor," and a finding of necessity can be made only
after a determination that other sources are insufficient. In such
cases, available resources of the parents to support the minor will
have been exhausted. Distribution of the fund under this provi-
sion, then, will not discharge the parental duty of support, but
rather will only supplement it. Section 4(c), therefore, does not af-
fect the analysis of the availability of UGMA property to discharge
obligations to support minors.
Neither section 4(i), section 4(c), nor any other provision of
the Act aids in construing the language of section 4(b). The literal
and most workable construction confers upon the custodian the
authority to distribute the property in a manner that benefits the
minor's parents. This power is inconsistent with the statement of
section 3(a) that the minor donee is the sole beneficiary of UGMA
property.
25. UGMA § 4(c) (emphasis added). No counterpart to § 4(c) of the Uniform Act ex-
isted in the Model Gifts of Securities to Minors Act.
26. In Butcher v. Butcher, 544 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976), a father appealed
from a divorce court order requiring him to pay child support. The father argued that the
UGMA fund, held for the child by the mother as custodian, should be taken into considera-
tion in reducing the amount of child support for which he was liable. The court rejected the
father's claim, stating that under the provisions of the Missouri Uniform Act the custodian
mother "is under no duty to provide support for the beneficiary... The trial court clearly
could not in considering the welfare of the child be sure that income would be available to
the minor." Id. at 256. The father apparently did not rely upon the discretionary language
of § 4(c) to support his claim. The court looked to § 4(b) as authority for its conclusion that
the custodian has no duty to support the minor out of the custodial fund when other sources
of support are available.
27. 8 UNn' OR LAws ANNOTATD 207 (1972) (emphasis added).
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B. Early Warnings
When the Model and Uniform Acts were first enacted, they
were the subject of much discussion in legal journals. Some schol-
ars who scrutinized these new laws anticipated the problems that
have arisen regarding the authority of the custodian to use the
fund for the minor's support. For example, the author of one criti-
cal summary of the Model Act analyzed the section dealing with
distributive powers of the custodian as follows: "Under this au-
thority, a parent acting as custodian can support his child with the
child's own property and income so that all or a substantial por-
tion may be consumed without any actual advantage to the mi-
nor.' 8 The author assumed without discussion that the custodian
has the authority to use gift securities to discharge support oblig-
tions of the minor's parents. In states that had changed the stan-
dard for payment from the Model Act standard of "support, main-
tenance, education and general use and benefit," by deleting the
term "general use," the author felt that the authority of the custo-
dian to use the fund for support was "less clear."" Finally, in an
effort to remedy the perceived uncertainty regarding the custo-
dian's authority, the author suggested that "some clear standard
should be written into the act for the distribution of property."
The author proposed that a standard "allowing distributions from
property only for emergencies" and not in discharge of the support
duty would eliminate the identified ambiguity.30 The National
Conference of Commissioners, however, did not adopt the pro-
posed."emergency" standard in the Uniform Act. Rather, the "sup-
port, maintenance, education and benefit" standard, regarded in
the work cited above as the most ambiguous, was incorporated into
the UGMA.
A premonition of the problems created by the Model Act's un-
certain definition of custodial powers led the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York's Committee on State Legislation to
disapprove the Model Act when it was introduced into the state
legislature in 1955. Among the Association's objections to the pro-
posed legislation were that "it created a new type of legal relation-
ship without setting out in sufficient detail the applicable powers,
duties and liabilities of the custodian ... [and that] everyone con-
cerned with a gift of securities to a minor was given complete pro-
28. 69 HARv. L. Rzv. 1476, 1480 (1956) (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 1480 n.31.
30. Id.
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tection, except the minor." '
While the Association's objections to the language of the
Model Act do not specifically refer to the invasion of funds for
support, the objections seem to relate to that concern. The author-
ity to use the funds for such a purpose, if it exists, is an important
power of the custodian. This power certainly decreases the protec-
tion afforded the interest of the minor under the Act since it gives
rise to the possibility that the fund may be used for the benefit of
someone other than the minor.
Prior to the issuance of rulings on point by the Internal Reve-
nue Service, writers who attempted to predict the federal tax con-
sequences of transfers under the Model Act were similarly troubled
by the ambiguity of the Act's provisions.33 Various tax conse-
quences turn upon whether the custodian has authority to use the
custodial property in discharge of support duties owed to the mi-
nor.83 The statute's lack of clarity in this area led scholars to disa-
gree both on that underlying issue and, as a result, on the taxation
issues."
Since section 3(a) seems to foreclose the existence of an inter-
est in the custodial property in anyone other than the minor, the
income and estate tax treatment of such property should accord-
ingly be modeled after the treatment of an outright gift. Gifts gen-
erate income and estate tax consequences for no one other than
the donee. If, however, the focus is on the language of section 4(b),
it is possible to conclude that the custodial fund is available for the
indirect benefit of parents obligated to support the minor donee.
The tax laws would then impose income and estate tax burdens
upon the parent in certain circumstances."5
Existing income, estate, and gift tax rules rely selectively upon
the two conflicting definitions of the interests created by the custo-
dial arrangement. This lack of integrity in the tax treatment of
31. The Bar Association Comm. Bull. No. 6, Memo No. 104, at 351 (1955), quoted in
Newman, The Uniform Gifts to Minors Act in New York and Other Jurisdictions-Tax
Consequences, Possible Abuses, and Recommendations, 49 CoRNspL L.Q. 12, 15 n.32 (1963).
32. See Lauritzen, Tax Problems on Gifts of Securities to Minors-Additional Com-
ments, 1 TAx COUNSLOR'S Q. 123 (1957); Mallory, Estate, Gift and Income Tax Problems
Under Gifts of Securities to Minors Acts, 9 U.S. CAL. TAx INsT. 649, 663-64 (1957); Letter
from Daniel G. Tenney, Jr., to Christian M. Lauritzen 11, appearing at 1 TAx CouNsELoR's
Q. 123 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Tenney].
33. See Parts IV & V infra.
34. Compare Lauritzen, supra note 32, with Tenney, supra note 32.
35. See Lauritzen, supra note 32; Mallory, supra note 32; Tenney, supra note 32;
Parts IV & V infra.
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uniform gifts is discussed at length in Part IV of this Article.
C. The Surviving Spouse's Elective Share
The inconsistent meanings expressed by sections 3(a) and 4(b)
have prompted litigation between parties interested in the nature
of the custodial relationship. The courts called upon to articulate
the custodian's authority to use the custodial fund for the minor's
support have failed to clarify the ambiguity in the Act.
In Schwartz Estate6 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania re-
viewed a surviving wife's claim, under the state's elective share
statute, to a share of property placed into custodianship by her
deceased husband. The decedent had made the gift of property,
valued at $37,000, to his son by a former marriage shortly before
decedent's death. The relevant statutory provision allowed the
widow to reach transferred property in which the decedent had re-
tained certain incidents, of ownership, including the power of
consumption.
The trial court,"7 relying upon section 4(b) of the Uniform Act,
resolved the issue in favor of the surviving spouse. The court noted
that prior to the creation of the custodianship the decedent was
under a duty to support the minor. The opinion does not indicate
whether the duty existed pursuant to a court order, or simply
under the general rule in the state requiring parents to support
their minor children. Next, the court held that section 4(b) of the
Uniform Act allowed the father to use the transferred property in
discharge of his preexisting obligation of support. Since this au-
thority constituted a power to consume under the election statute,
the court concluded that the surviving spouse was entitled to a
share of the fund. The court's opinion does not consider the possi-
ble impact of section 3(a) of the UGMA upon the custodial powers
set out in section 4(b). Thus, the trial court never confronted the
ambiguity in the Uniform Act.
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court likewise failed to
deal with the inconsistency of the statutory provisions. The court
assumed, since neither party had placed the matter in issue, that
under section 4(b) the custodian could in fact have used the fund
to support his son.38 Next, citing section 3 of the Act, the court
stated that the "custodian may exercise his power of consumption
36. 449 Pa. 112, 295 A.2d 600 (1972).
37. 94 Montg. 168 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1971).
38. 449 Pa. at 115 n.2, 295 A.2d at 603 n.2.
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over the custodial property solely for the benefit of the minor and
not for the custodian's benefit."39 Thus, unlike the trial court, the
supreme court set out both relevant provisions. The court, how-
ever, failed to make the next logical step in the analysis and con-
front the impossibility of relying upon both provisions simultane-
ously. Instead, the court simply concluded that section 3(a)
forecloses the possible use of the fund for the indirect benefit of
the parent. Therefore, no power existed to consume the fund under
the elective share statute, and the widow's claim was disallowed.
The court did not indicate how this conclusion could be reconciled
with its initial assumption, set out above, that the fund could be
used by the parent to relieve his support duty.'0
The failure of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to confront
the ambiguity in the Uniform Act resulted in a confusing opinion
that has been the subject of criticism. 1
D. Erdmann v. Erdmann
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Erdmann v. Erdmann2
also failed to bring order to this confusing area. The gifts involved
in Erdmann had been created when the minor donee's parents di-
vorced. The divorce decree required the father to transfer invest-
ment trust shares to himself as custodian under the Wisconsin
UGMA. The money to purchase the shares had been given to the
children by their grandfather.'8 In addition, the decree granted
39. Id. at 117, 295 A.2d at 603.
40. The court's own preference for § 3 over § 4 is reflected in an earlier statement that
§ 4(b) can be read as conferring only administrative powers upon the custodian rather than
the substantive authority to use the property to discharge support duties:
In order to give the custodian maximum flexibility in the administration of the
fund, the Act specifically provides that he can make distributions for the benefit of the
minor "with or without regard" to his own or any other person's duty to support the
minor. The plain meaning of the language does not indicate that the custodian can use
the proceeds of the fund in lieu of an independent prior support obligation.
449 Pa. at 115 n.2, 295 A.2d at 603 n.2. As stated in the text, however, the court assumes, for
purposes of the opinion, that the proper reading of § 4(b) does allow the use of the fund to
relieve parental support dtsties.
41. See 12 DuQ. L. Rsv. 125, 131-36 (1973); 47 TEMP. L.Q. 140, 146-53 (1973). The
Schwartz opinion is cited with approval in In re Estate of Zeigher, 95 Misc. 2d 230, 406
N.Y.S.2d 977 (Sur. Ct. 1978). In Zeigher the surviving spouse asked the court to include
transfers made by the decedent under the UGMA in the elective estate. The court refused
to do so. Without considering the relevant terms of the UGMA, the court accepted the
statement in Schwartz that the fund cannot be used for the benefit of the custodian. Id. at
231, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
42. 67 Wis. 2d 116, 226 N.W.2d 439 (1975).
43. The court stated that even though the shares were held in the father's name, they
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custody of the children to the mother and required that the father
pay a monthly allowance for child support as well as all medical
and educational expenses incurred by the children. During the mi-
nority of the children the father invaded the custodial fund for
their support, medical, and educational expenses. At the time of
their majority he handed over to them the balance of the custodial
fund as required by the Act. The mother sued for reimbursement
of the amounts expended for the children's benefit. The father's
defense was section 4(b) of the Uniform Act." The trial court re-
jected his defense, and the supreme court affirmed.45
While it is clear that that court did not believe that section
4(b) justified the father's use of the funds to relieve his own obliga-
tion to the children, it is less clear why the court reached this con-
clusion. The court said,
While the investment fund here created incorporates the Uniform Gifts
to Minors statutory provisions, it remains a court-created fund of property
belonging to the children and to be used for their benefit .... Here the role
and authority of the court-named custodian are alike impressed with a trust
obligation to treat the fund as belonging to the children and to expend it only
for the benefit of the children, not for the benefit of the trustee.
... [W]here the fund is court-created and the fund involved represents
property of the children who are the sole beneficiaries of the fund, the par-
ent-custodian here was required to apply to the court which created the fund
to establish the fact of his inability as parent to make the payments ordered,
belonged to the children. Id. at 122, 226 N.W.2d at 442. Under § 2(a) of the Act, only prop-
erty owned by an adult can be transferred into the custodial arrangement. Arguably, the
property could not be transferred under the UGMA. The court does not deal with this issue.
44. The defendant father also argued that Estate of Prudowsky v. Commissioner, 55
T.C. 890 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 465 F.2d 62 (7th Cir. 1972), was authority for his use of
the funds to discharge his support duties. In Prudowsky the Tax Court held that custodial
property could be included in the gross estate of the donor-parent custodian. The court
relied alternatively upon two provisions of the Internal Revenue Code-§§ 2036 and 2038.
The property was includible under § 2036 because the taxpayer had the authority to use it
in discharge of his own support obligation. The court cited § 4(b) of the UGMA in support
of this conclusion without any discussion. The property was includible under § 2038 because
the taxpayer had the power to terminate the relationship by paying out the entire fund to
the minor.
In Erdmann the Wisconsin court held first that § 2038, not § 2036, provided the neces-
sary basis for including the property. 67 Wis. 2d at 120-21, 226 N.W.2d at 441-42. The court,
however, simply did not deal with the key issue, i.e., the Tax Court's determination that the
UGMA allows the discharge of support duties. The court misread the Prudowsky treatment
of termination power under § 2038, stating that the Tax Court found authority in the custo-
dian to terminate by revoking for his own benefit. Id. at 120, 226 N.W.2d at 442. The court
distinguished Prudowsky, then, by pointing out that the father in Erdmann had no such
power. Id. at 121, 226 N.W.2d at 442. The court's analysis is disappointing.
For a discussion of § 2036, § 2038, and Prudowsky, see Part IV infra.
45. 67 Wis. 2d 116, 226 N.W.2d 439.
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and of the need or benefit to the children in using the fund to make such
payments as a custodian.
46
The court seemed to say that, because the custodianship was cre-
ated by a judicial order, the court remained interested in its opera-
tion, and could require that its permission be obtained before dis-
tributions that might benefit the parent could be made. This
aspect of the arrangement was not expressly set out in the divorce
decree, and it is inconsistent with section 4(b) of the Uniform Act,
which authorizes the custodian to make distributions "with or
without court order." In other words, the arrangement, in the eyes
of the court, was not truly a uniform gift; it was a court-created
device that selectively applied the UGMA provisions. It is unlikely,
therefore, that the court intended the Erdmann holding to extend
beyond the facts of the case to situations in which the custodian-
ship is not court-created.47 When so limited, the opinion does not
aid in the effort to resolve the ambiguity in the UGMA.
Nevertheless, the Erdmann dispute probably would not have
arisen but for the effect of section 4(b) on this arrangement regard-
ing property vested in the children. The same conflict between
ownership of the fund and a parent's interest suggested by section
4(b) exists in every uniform gift. The conflict must be resolved.
Ill. RESOLVING THE AMBIGUITY IN THE UGMA
The resolution of the conflict in meaning between sections 3(a)
and 4(b) of the UGMA must take the form of modification of one
of the statutory provisions. Either section 3(a) must be altered to
recognize that the interest of the minor is subject to a use of the
property for the parent's benefit, or section 4(b) must be rewritten
to foreclose any use of the custodial fund to discharge parental
support obligations to the minor. Most appropriately, this modifi-
cation should occur at the legislative level; alternatively, courts
faced with the issue must identify and confront the statutory in-
46. Id. at 122-23, 226 N.W.2d at 442-43.
47. Arguably, some of the court's statements are broad enough to apply generally to
uniform gifts. To the extent that the court relied upon the fact that the property belongs
exclusively to the minor as the basis for disallowing use of the fund to discharge a support
duty, the analysis might apply to all custodianships. Every donee of a uniform gift acquires
irrevocably vested legal and equitable title under § 3(a). It is not at all clear from the court's
opinion, however, that the ownership interest of the minor, absent the involvement of the
court, would generate the same result.
A contrary view appears in 59 MARQ. L. Rzv. 447, 453 (1976), in which the author con-
cludes that Erdmann prohibits the use of custodial funds to discharge the parental support
duty whenever the parent is the custodian, but not the donor, of the uniform gift.
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consistency. 48 Only a resolution of this ambiguity will create cer-
tainty regarding the nature of the property interests and the au-
thority of custodians under the UGMA. Then the federal taxing
authorities will be required to treat the arrangement as creating
the same interests for all tax purposes.
In resolving the ambiguity in the UGMA, the goal must be to
reform the provisions in accordance with the original intent of the
drafters. Their expressions of intent in the body of the Act are, of
course, inconsistent. The Commissioners' comments on the rele-
vant provisions shed no light on the matter. In seeking to identify
the drafters' probable intent, it is helpful to investigate their pur-
pose in drafting the Uniform Act.
As the Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the 1966 Revision of
the UGMA points out, prior to the Model Gifts of Securities to
Minors Act of 1955 no satisfactory method of making modest gifts
of securities to minors existed.49 Each of the available property ar-
rangements-outright transfer to the minor, transfer to a nominee,
transfer to a trust, and establishment of a guardianship of the
property for the minor-had significant flaws. The main purpose of
the Model Act and the subsequent Uniform Act was to establish a
new method of transferring property to minors.8 0
It is possible to transfer property, including securities, out-
right to a minor. The problem with this method of making a gift
arises when an attempt is made to reconvey the asset. Since minors
generally have the power to disaffirm their contracts, 1 at least un-
til their age of majority, potential purchasers are reluctant to deal
with the minor seeking to transfer securities in the minor's name.
Property placed in the child's name may become "frozen" and in-
48. The issue arose in Schwartz Estate, 449 Pa. 112, 295 A.2d 600 (1972), and in
Erdmann v. Erdmann, 67 Wis. 2d 116, 226 N.W.2d 439 (1975). The failure of the courts in
these cases to confront the ambiguity in the statute is discussed in the text accompanying
notes 36 47 supra. The question of the fund's availability to discharge support duties has
also arisen in a number of federal tax cases. As discussed in Part IV infra, the courts decid-
ing these cases also have failed to reconcile their results with both § 3(a) and § 4(b).
49. 8 U NrORm LAws ANNOTATm 182 (1972). For more detailed discussions of the
available methods of making gifts of securities to minors prior to the Act, see Browning,
Gifts to Minors, 27 CONN. B.J. 407 (1953); Rogers, Some Practical Considerations in Gifts
to Minors, 20 FoRnHnA L. REv. 233 (1951).
50. Moore, Uniform Gifts of Securities to Minors Act: A Consideration of Its Merits,
33 U. DEr. L.J. 298, 299.306 (1956); 44 CALm. L. REv. 569, 569-73 (1956); 25 FoRDHAM L.
Rav. 390, 390-91 (1956); 69 H1Rv. L. Rnv. 1476, 1476-78 (1956); 33 IND. L.J. 242, 244-51
(1958); 54 MICH. L. REv. 883, 883-85 (1956); 32 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 203, 203-05 (1957).
51. 1A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 227 (1963); J. MuRRAY, MURRAY ON CON-
TRACTS § 12 (2d rev. ed. 1974); RESTATEmEN (SEcoND) o CONTRACTS § 18B, Comment b
(Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973).
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capable of being transferred until the child's majority.
The method of transferring securities to a nominee for the
benefit of the minor is likewise objectionable. Since the property is
not registered in the child's name, it is uncertain whether delivery,
an essential element of making a gift, can be established. There
may be no effective transfer, therefore, to the minor. In addition,
the room for abuse of the child's interests under this method is
obvious.
Two devices that overcome these problems are the guardian-
ship and the trust. A guardian of the property may be appointed
by the court to receive and manage securities donated to the mi-
nor.52 A guardian can enter into a binding contract to sell the se-
curities. The interests of the child in the property will be carefully
guarded by the court that created the relationship. If, however, the
gift is a small one, the high degree of protection provided by the
guardianship arrangement and the attendant costs may make the
arrangement impractical. In addition to the initial requirement
that the court create the relationship, there may be a requirement
that the guardian post bond, account to the court periodically, and
obtain a court order before selling the property. The expense and
inflexibility of the guardianship may discourage the use of the de-
vice for transferring property to a minor.
Like the guardianship, the trust avoids the problems created
by placing title in the minor or in a nominee. Furthermore, the
flexibility missing in the guardianship arrangement can be drafted
into the terms of a trust. Nevertheless, the drafters of the UGMA
believed that the trust did not provide a useful alternative for
making gifts of securities to minors because of the cost involved in
creating a trust. Especially in the case of a small gift, the threshold
cost of a lawyer's services to draft the instrument could be
prohibitive.
Both the Model Act and the Uniform Act sought to establish a
method for making small gifts to minors that avoided the problems
encountered in the existing devices. To that end, the Acts create a
custodial relationship in which the adult custodian has broad pow-
ers to manage and enter into contracts involving the property
transferred to a minor. The Uniform Act protects the interests of
the minor to the extent that it requires the minor's interest to be
expressly stated in the document creating the custodianship. The
52. See, e.g., 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5111 (Purdon 1975).
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Uniform Act provides a simple and inexpensive" method for trans-
ferring property that usually entails no judicial involvement.5 The
donor simply states in writing that he or she is making a transfer
of the designated property "to A as custodian for B under the
State X UGMA."
The drafters of the Model Act devised the custodial relation-
ship in an effort to create an alternative device to the outright gift,
guardianship, and trust arrangements. The drafters, however, ex-
pressed contradictory intentions on the issue of the availability of
the custodial property for the minor's support. In seeking to clarify
their intent, an examination of this aspect of the gift, guardian-
ship, and trust arrangements is relevant.
Outright gifts to a child by a parent or anyone else do not
reduce the parental support obligation. An outright gift, of course,
vests legal and equitable title in the child and confers no right or
interest in the property upon any other person.55 Use of the prop-
erty for the support of the minor has the effect of shifting the ben-
efit from the minor to the parent, whose support obligation is
thereby reduced, an effect that is generally impermissible. The ex-
ception to this rule is the necessitous circumstance when the par-
ent is without resources to support the child.5 6
The general rule has its most frequent application in the con-
text of the broken family, after a court has ordered custody of the
child to one parent and imposed a fixed obligation of support upon
the noncustodial parent. In this setting, "it is generally recognized
that gratuitous contributions from relatives, friends, charities, or
governmental agencies neither indicate a diminished need for child
support nor reduce the .. . [noncustodial parent's] obligation to
furnish such support. '5 7
53. Under the UGMA, the reasonable expenses of managing the property are chargea-
ble to the estate. Generally, no bond is required. A custodian other than a donor custodian,
may be compensated for services from the fund. See UGMA § 5.
54. Judicial intervention will take place only upon the petition of an interested party
in exceptional circumstances. The court may be asked to intervene to remove a custodian or
to appoint a successor custodian. UGMA § 7(d)-(f). Such petitions will be granted only for
good cause. See Martin v. Martin, 271 So. 2d 391 (Miss. 1972); Application of Muller, 18
A.D.2d 1067, 239 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1963) (petitions for removal denied). Section 8 of the
UGMA allows designated parties to petition the court for an order requiring the custodian
to make an accounting.
55. If the property received by the minor exceeds a certain value, the law may require
the appointment of a guardian for the property. See, e.g., 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5101
(Purdon 1975).
56. 67A C.J.S. Parent & Child § 51 (1978).
57. Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 324, 346 (1965); see, e.g., Slaughter v. Slaughter, 313 S.W.2d
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When the court places property of a minor in the hands of a
guardian, legal and equitable title remain in the minor. The rela-
tionship between the guardian and ward with regard to the prop-
erty is a fiduciary one that generally requires the guardian to use
the property solely for the benefit of the ward.5 8 Under most cir-
cumstances use of the ward's estate in discharge of any support
duty owed to the ward by the guardian or another would constitute
a breach of this fiduciary duty.5
A trust is a fiduciary arrangement in which the trustee as-
sumes possession of and legal title to property and manages it for
the benefit of the beneficiary who has equitable title. Absent an
express statement to the contrary in the creating instrument, prop-
erty held in trust for a minor beneficiary, like the outright gift and
guardianship estate discussed above, cannot lawfully be used for
the beneficiary's support in a way that reduces the obligation of
support of the minor's parents.60 The use for the indirect benefit of
the parent is a breach of the trustee's fiduciary obligation to use
the property solely for the benefit of the beneficiary.
The trust is a very flexible device. The settlor, in the private
act of creation, can establish the terms of the trust; many varia-
tions in the terms are possible. The donor can create a trust that
expressly provides that income and/or principal can or must be
used by the trustee for the support of the minor, and that such use
is intended to relieve parental duties of support owed by the trus-
tee or others. Such a trust by its express terms is intended to bene-
fit the parents as well as the minor beneficiary.
Even when trusts are created expressly for the support of a
minor beneficiary, uncertainty can exist about the scope of the
trustee's authority to disburse the funds for support. In a number
of cases in which the trust terms are unclear on the issue the
courts have been asked to determine whether the trustee must
take into consideration the amount of support owed to the child by
its parents and to limit distributions for support to those needed
to supplement this resource. As a general rule, the result will turn
upon the court's determination of the settlor's intent regarding the
matter.61
193 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
58. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 17, at 37 (5th
ed. 1973).
59. E.g., 39 C.J.S. Guardian and Ward §§ 64(c), 65(b) (1976).
60. 2 A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTs § 168, at 1291 (3d ed. 1967).
61. Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 255, 262 (1972); see, e.g., Ingalls v. Ingalls, 256 Al 321, 54 So.
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It is unclear whether the drafters of the UGMA intended to
create a property arrangement modeled after the outright gift and
guardianship or whether they intended to create a device that for
this purpose was like the unlimited support trust. On the one
hand, the custodianship is patterned after the guardianship in
many respects. Although the UGMA expressly deviates from the
guardianship model by abolishing the requirements of judicial par-
ticipation in the arrangement, other important characteristics of
the guardianship arrangement appear in the Act. Like the guard-
ian, the custodian acquires neither legal nor equitable title to the
property. Section 4(i) of the UGMA provides that the custodian
has all of the powers of a guardian under state law. The stated
purpose of the Act is to set up a convenient means of making gifts
to children. It does not mention gifts for the benefit of minors and
their parents. It is very possible that the drafters' intent was to
follow the guardianship and outright gift examples and not to con-
fer a benefit upon parents.
On the other hand, it is possible to interpret section 4(b) as
similar to the term in a support trust instrument expressing an
intention that the property be available to discharge support du-
ties owed to the minor beneficiary. Under this analysis, section
4(b) is a specific limitation of the more general statement of sec-
tion 3(a) that the property belongs to the minor.
It is impossible to follow both the guardianship and the spe-
cial support trust models, although the UGMA currently attempts
to do so. The resulting inconsistency can be eliminated in one of
two ways. Section 4(b) can be modified to remove any custodial
authority to use the fund to relieve parental support duties. Con-
versely, section 3(a) can be rewritten to provide that the interest of
the minor in custodial property is not absolute, but rather is lim-
ited by the parental interest found in section 4(b). This limitation
has not been read into the current language of section 3(a) by ei-
ther the courts or the Internal Revenue Service in the area of fed-
eral gift taxation. Thus, if the drafters' purpose was to allow the
use of the fund to benefit the parent, this purpose is not being
accomplished in all cases. If, on the other hand, the true purpose
of the Act is to confer benefit upon the minor alone, then the lan-
guage of section 4(b) is an obstacle to its accomplishment.
The general purpose of the Uniform Act is to create a device
for making gifts to minors. That purpose should be the controlling
2d 296 (1951); In re Cameron's Trusts, 127 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sur. Ct. 1954).
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factor in this analysis. By providing that custodial property vests
irrevocably in the minor, section 3(a) is consistent with the goal.
To the extent that section 4(b) is inconsistent with the general
purpose, it should be rewritten to clearly limit the distributive
powers of the custodian. The modification would clarify the custo-
dian's inability to use the fund for the minor's support, and the
corresponding absence of any property interest in the parent for
elective share, federal tax, or other purposes. The clarification
would eliminate the need to litigate these issues in cases like
Schwartz Estate6" and Erdmann v. Erdmann.8
IV. THE TAX TREATMENT OF UNIFORM Girs: REFLECTION OF AN
AMmGurrY
Section 3(a) of the UGMA provides that the minor donee has
absolutely vested legal and equitable title to the gift property. On
the other hand, section 4(b) provides that the custodian has the
authority to use the fund for, inter alia, the support of the donee.
This use, to the extent that it offsets the parent's duty to support
the donee, benefits the parent and is inconsistent with the state-
ment in section 3(a) that the minor has the total interest in the
custodial fund.
These irreconcilable definitions of the interests created under
the UGMA have resulted in the inconsistent treatment of the ar-
rangement for federal tax purposes. The gift tax treatment is
based upon section 3(a), which recognizes only the interest of the
minor, resulting in the taxation of a UGMA transfer as a com-
pleted gift. Conversely, the income and estate tax consequences are
based upon, inter alia, the availability of the custodial fund for
support. This treatment ignores the section 3(a) statement that the
donee alone has an interest in the property. It is inappropriate to
base the various tax consequences of a transaction selectively upon
one or the other of its inconsistent characteristics. In UGMA cases,
however, the Internal Revenue Service has done so in a manner
that generates maximum tax revenue.
As a threshold matter, it is necessary to distinguish the per-
ceived inconsistency here from other familiar situations in which,
under well-established principles, a single transaction is treated
62. 449 Pa. 112, 295 A.2d 600 (1972). See notes 36-41 supra and accompanying text.
63. 67 Wis. 2d 116, 226 N.W.2d 439 (1975). See notes 42-47 supra and accompanying
text.
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differently for income, estate, and gift tax purposes." A transfer
that is "complete" for gift tax purposes and therefore is subject to
the gift tax when made, for example, may nonetheless be viewed as
"incomplete" for estate tax purposes and so includible in the gross
estate at the time of the donor's death. If 0, owning property in
fee, transfers the property "to 0 for life, remainder to X," 0 must
pay gift tax on the value of the remainder at the time of the trans-
fer under Internal Revenue Code section 2511.5 0 has made a
completed gift of that value to X because 0 has relinquished do-
minion and control over the remainder. Yet upon O's death, the
full fair market value of the property may be included in O's gross
estate under section 2036. The retention of a life estate means that
for estate tax purposes no part of the transfer is complete until the
donor's death. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Smith v.
Shaughnessy, e the landmark case allowing inconsistent treatment
of transfers with a retained interest, the creation by Congress of an
estate tax credit for gift taxes paid on property includible in the
gross estate suggests that the two taxes were not intended always
to be mutually exclusive. 7
In a case in which the transfer of property is viewed as com-
plete for the purposes of one transfer tax, but not the other, the
income tax treatment necessarily will be inconsistent with one or
the other. In the above hypothetical, for example, O's transfer of
property "to 0 for life, remainder to X" will be viewed as an in-
complete transfer for income tax purposes. That is, the income will
continue to be taxed to 0 after the conveyance. The income tax
treatment is consistent with the estate tax treatment but inconsis-
tent with the gift tax perception that the inter vivos transfer was
complete.
In the above hypothetical, the transfer is complete for gift tax
purposes and incomplete for estate and income tax purposes be-
64. This phenomenon of differing definitions of taxable conduct for the various taxing
systems has been referred to as the "gift, gaft, geft" phenomenon. The phrase comes from
the suggestion of Judge Frank in Commissioner v. Beck's Estate, 129 F.2d 243, 246 (2d Cir.
1942), that the use of the several words might help to clarify the area. The lack of mutuality
among the taxing systems in this regard is discussed at D. KAHN, E. COLSON & G. CRAVEN,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF ESTATES, GnTs, AND TRusTs 250 (2d ed. 1975); C. LowNDES, R.
KARimzr & J. McCoRD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND Girr TAXEs 703-05 (3d ed. 1974); 3 RESEARCH
INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, ESTATE PLANNING & TAX COORDINATOR 47,660 (1980).
65. I.R.C. § 2511. All references to Code sections hereinafter are to the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954 unless otherwise indicated.
66. 318 U.S. 176 (1943).
67. Id. at 179.
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cause tax authorities utilize different definitions of "complete-
ness." The hypothetical transfer is, however, uniformly perceived
as creating a vested remainder in X following a retained life estate
inO.
Compare this with the treatment of a transfer under the
UGMA. Suppose that 0, owning property, transfers it to 0 as cus-
todian for O's child C, pursuant to the provisions of the UGMA.
Gift tax law regards the transaction as the creation of total owner-
ship interests in C, applies the gift tax definition of completeness,
and taxes the transfer. Estate tax law relies upon the retained in-
terest of 0 as indirect beneficiary under UGMA section 4(b) and
includes the full value of the property in O's gross estate under
section 2036. Similarly, income tax law recognizes the interest of
the parent created by section 4(b) of the Act, resulting in potential
income tax consequences for the parent. The inconsistency exists
not only in the varying definitions of complete transfer used by the
taxing systems, but also in the perceived nature of the arrange-
ment being taxed. Indeed, as discussed below, the result under the
gift tax would be different in many cases if the possible use of the
fund for the benefit of the parent were acknowledged. The results
under section 2036, and the income tax consequences, would be
different if total vesting in the donee were acknowledged.
It is inappropriate for the tax laws to treat the custodial ar-
rangement as creating one set of relationships for one federal tax
system and a different set of relationships for another. Neverthe-
less, the inconsistency between sections 3(a) and 4(b) of the
UGMA allows such an anomalous result.
A. The Gift Tax
The expectation of the New York Stock Exchange attorneys
who drafted the Model Gifts of Securities to Minors Act was that
the transfers made pursuant to the Act's provisions would be
viewed as completed gifts when made and would qualify for the
annual gift tax exclusion. Further, all income after the transfer
would be attributed to the minor donee, and for estate tax pur-
poses would be includible only in the estate of the donee. This tax
perception of the arrangement is consistent, treating the gift as ab-
solutely vesting the property in the donee for all tax purposes."
68. For a detailed description of the communications between attorneys for the New
York Stock Exchange and the Internal Revenue Service during the period after the promul-
gation of the Model Act and before the issuance of the revenue rulings on point, see New-
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Consistent with these expectations, Revenue Ruling 56-8669
set forth the gift tax consequences of a transfer under the Act. The
Internal Revenue Service took the position that the transfer con-
stitutes a completed gift at the time of the transfer and is there-
fore subject to the gift tax. Furthermore, the Service concluded
that the transfer qualifies for the $3,000 per donee annual exclu-
sion for gifts of present interests under Internal Revenue Code sec-
tion 2503(b).7 0 The conclusion that the transfer constitutes a com-
pleted gift is based expressly upon the fact that the statutory
transfer "conveys to the minor indefeasibly vested legal title to the
securities. ' 71 It ignores, however, the provision of the Act that al-
lows use of the property for the donee's support. Despite the rul-
ing's possible infirmity on this ground, no cases have been reported
in which the validity of Revenue Ruling 56-86 has been challenged.
B. The Income Tax
Prior to the issuance of revenue rulings on point, it was impos-
sible to predict with certainty the income tax consequences of
transfers under the Model Act:
If the custodianship is regarded as equivalent to a trust for the minor, for
income tax purposes, taxation will presumably be governed by I.R.C. Sections
671-678....
If the custodianship is not regarded as equivalent to a trust, but as anal-
ogous to a guardianship or as being unique and distinctive, for income tax
purposes, taxation will presumably be governed by I.R.C. Section 61 and the
case law under it .... That, it is submitted, is the preferable and more ac-
curate analysis of the nature of the minor's ownership under the Gifts of Se-
curities to Minors Act. It gives effect to the emphatic declaration in the Act
that a gift of securities under the Act "shall convey to the minor indefeasibly
vested legal title to the securities thus delivered." It is consistent with the
holding and background of Rev. Rul. 56-86 which ruled on the gift tax conse-
quences of a gift of securities to a minor under the Act. It should result in
taxation of the entire custodianship income to the minor alone."
The author was understandably unable to predict whether the sup-
man, supra note 31, at 35-43.
69. 1956-1 C.B. 449.
70. For a discussion of § 2503, see text accompanying notes 105-07 infra.
71. Rev. Rul. 56-86, 1956-1 C.B. 449.
72. Mallory, supra note 32, at 656-57 (footnotes omitted).
Sections 671-678 comprise the portion of Subchapter J of the Code dealing expressly
with grantor trusts. In the situations identified in those sections, the grantor is regarded for
income tax purposes as the owner of the trust fund. If a trust were created and the trustee-
grantor expressly retained the powers set out in § 4 of the UGMA, § 677(b) would apply. To
the extent that the grantor trustee actually distributed income in discharge of the support
obligation, the trust fund would be regarded as the grantor's retained property, and the
income so used would be taxed to the grantor under § 677(b).
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port trust model or the guardianship model would be applied to
determine the tax consequences of gifts under the Act. To the ex-
tent that income under the Model Act could be used lawfully to
discharge the obligation of the parent, the appropriate reference
would be to a trust setting rather than to the outright gift situa-
tion. On the other hand, as the transfer is totally vested in the
minor, to the exclusion of interests in anyone else, the more appro-
priate analogy would be to the outright gift situation, with the in-
come tax burden properly falling upon the donee. The two con-
cepts, which are both present in the Model Act, are inconsistent.
For income tax purposes, the Service chose to rely upon the
former.
Revenue Ruling 56-48473 states that the income from securi-
ties transferred pursuant to the Model Act is income of the person
legally responsible for the support of the minor donee to the extent
that the income is actually used to discharge the obligation.7' In-
come not so used is taxable to the minor. The ruling expressly re-
lies upon the provision in the Act that allows use of both the
fund's income and its corpus to support the minor.75
The ruling distinguishes cases in which an outright gift to a
minor is made with no express provision for support. The laws of
most jurisdictions would disallow the use of such property for the
support of the minor, thereby negating any indirect benefit flowing
to the parent whose support duty would be satisfied by such a use.
When use of the minor's property for the indirect benefit of an-
other is proscribed by law, the income is taxable only to the
minor .7
The provision in the Model Act, like an express provision in a
73. 1956-2 C.B. 23.
74. The ruling analogizes the statutory gift to the support trust for income tax pur-
poses. Reliance is expressly placed upon the general definition-of-income provision, § 61, not
upon the taxation-of-trust income sections of the Code. This properly reflects the fact that
Subchapter J treats only the taxation of trusts, and that statutory gifts are not trusts.
The coverage of the ruling is wider than the analogous area covered by §§ 671-678 in
the trust setting, discussed at note 72, supra. The ruling states that "income derived from
property transferred under the model custodian act... which is used in the discharge or
satisfaction, in whole or in part, of a legal obligation of any person to support or maintain a
minor is, to the extent so used, taxable to such person under Section 61. ... Rev. RuL 56-
484, 1956-2 C.B. 23, 24 (emphasis added). In the trust area, taxation of income to the
nondonor parent in such a case would take place under § 662. Tress. Reg. § 1.662(a)-4
(1956).
75. Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 C.B. 23, 24.
76. Visintainer v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 519 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 858
(1951); Rev. Rul. 58-65, 1958-1 C.B. 13.
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trust agreement that permits the use of trust income for the sup-
port of the minor, is held to qualify "the property interest trans-
ferred to the minor under such trust or statute so as to permit the
use of all or a part of the income therefrom to be diverted to an-
other."7 7 For income tax purposes, then, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice recognizes that the minor donee's interest in the custodial
fund is not the absolutely vested legal and equitable title to the
property. Rather, the minor's interest is limited by an interest in
the parent that exists by virtue of the availability of the property
to relieve the parental support duty.
The revenue ruling had a chilling effect upon the theoretical,
as well as the tax planning, advantages of the Model Act.
The Treasury Department had thus, for income tax purposes, analogized
the custodian statute situation to a trust.... The attorneys for the Stock
Exchange believed this qualification to be dangerous on both the theoretical
and practical level. The theory of the custodian statute was that a mechanism
different from a trust relationship had been established. Thus, for example,
the investment standards were not those of the trustee but were more exten-
sive. The liability provisions were also more favorable to the custodian. This
was a new legal concept, neither trust nor guardianship. Yet the income tax
treatment did not recognize the creation of new concept but preferred instead
to treat it as a trust. As a practical matter, the Gifts to Minors Act would be
more attractive to the potential investor if the income were taxed only to the
minor, thus providing a means of shifting the income payable by the donor"
The Tax Court was called upon to apply Revenue Ruling 56-
48479 in Commissioner v. Friedman.80 Dividends from securities
held by the taxpayer parents, as custodians for their children
77. Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 C.B. 23, 24.
78. Newman, supra note 31, at 40 n.138.
79. In another case, the Tax Court considered the nature of the custodial realtionship,
not for the purpose of determining who should pay the income tax, but rather to determine
when the tax was payable. In Anastasio v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 814 (1977), the taxpayer
won $100,000 in a lottery in 1970 when he was 20 years old. State law required that the fund
be given to the taxpayer's parents as custodians for him under the UGMA. The custodians
paid over to the taxpayer the $100,000 plus interest in 1977 when he was 21. The parties
agreed that the donee would pay the tax on both the original gift and the income earned
during the year of custodianship. The issues were whether the prize was income to the tax-
payer in the year of the gift (1970) or in the year of distribution to him (1971) and whether
the interest was income to the taxpayer in the year earned (1970) or in the year of distribu-
tion to him (1971). Relying on an economic benefit theory, the court held that both amounts
were taxable to the donee in 1970. Under the provisions of the UGMA, the taxpayer "re-
ceived sufficient benefit to be subject to tax on the prize money in i970" to warrant inclu-
sion in income for that year. Id. at 817. The limitations upon his enjoyment imposed by the
UGMA's custodial requirements were deemed irrelevant. For this limited purpose of deter-
mining the timing of income taxation to the minor donee, the court expressly analogized the
UGMA to the guardianship arrangement. Id. at 818.
80. 37 T.C.M. (P-H) 792 (1968), afl'd, 421 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1970).
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under the Ohio UGMA, were included in the gross income of the
parents. In support of this result the court cited Revenue Ruling
56-484 and noted that "the dividends on all shares so held were
freely used by petitioners to satisfy personal obligations, including
their obligation to support their children."81 No attempt was made
to determine what amounts were actually used for the children's
support. The court therefore exceeded the scope of the ruling,
which allows taxation of income to one other than the minor only
when and to the extent that a support duty has been relieved. This
treatment may be justified by the facts of the case, which arguably
warrant a complete disregard of the transfer on the ground that it
was one of mere form rather than substance. The court noted that
all dividends received were placed in the taxpayers' checking ac-
count."2 In addition, the court observed that upon the twenty-first
birthday of one of the minor donees, no change was made by the
taxpayers in the ownership and control of the property held for
her.8 The distribution required by the UGMA was not made.
These facts suggest that the dividends were taxed to the parents
chiefly because they never really made a gift of the securities. Re-
grettably, however, the court placed no express reliance upon this
theory.8 '
C. The Estate Tax
The Internal Revenue Service stated its position on the estate
tax consequences of gifts made under the Model Act in Revenue
Ruling 57-366.85 The ruling relied upon Internal Revenue Code
section 2038 to include in the gross estate of the donor custodian
the value of property held in custodianship at the time of his or
her death. Of greater significance to this discussion is the subse-
quent reliance by the courts upon section 2036 as an alternative
basis for taxing the gift at the death of the donor parent custodian.
Revenue Ruling 56-366 analogized transfers under the Model
Act to certain transfers in trust taxable under section 2038 pursu-
81. Id. at 804.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. In another UGMA case the Tax Court relied upon this economic reality theory to
tax the income to the donor parents. In Duarte v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 193 (1965), the
taxpayers transferred shares in a Subchapter S corporation to their children under the
UGMA. The Tax Court rejected this attempt to shift the income tax burden to the children
because the facts of the case indicated that "[t]he purported transfers of stock by petitioner
to his minor children had no economic reality ... "Id. at 196.
85. 1957-2 C.B. 618.
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ant to well-established principles of estate taxation. Earlier, these
principles had been enunciated by the Supreme Court in two cases,
Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes86 and Lober v. United States.87
In Estate of Holmes the Court held that the value of certain
trusts created by the decedent for his children was includible in his
estate under a Code provision that, like section 2038 of the later
1954 Code, taxed transferred property over which the decedent
had the power to "alter, amend, revoke or terminate." The irrevo-
cable trust in Estate of Holmes gave the donor trustee discretion-
ary power to distribute or accumulate income and to distribute any
or all of the corpus at any time. Moreover, the trust provided that
if a primary beneficiary should die before the actual termination of
the trust, the primary beneficiary's portion of the trust would then
go to certain other designated individuals. The Court noted that
the decedent's power to accelerate the primary beneficiary's actual
enjoyment of the trust property could eliminate the possiblility
that the trust property would go to a secondary beneficiary be-
cause of a primary beneficiary's death prior to distribution. The
Court concluded that property subject to such a "power which af-
fects not only the time of enjoyment but also the person or persons
who may enjoy the donation" was taxable. 88
In Lober the Court extended the Estate of Holmes rule to a
trust in which the beneficiary had an indefeasibly vested equitable
interest. Under the terms of the trust agreement, the death of the
beneficiary prior to the termination of the trust would cause all
interest in the trust to pass to the beneficiary's estate. As in Estate
of Holmes, the donor trustee had discretion either to pay income
and principal to the named beneficiary at any time or to withhold
enjoyment until a time specified in the trust instrument. In this
case, however, the donor retained no power to terminate a contin-
gency, for there was no contingency. Rather, the power to delay or
accelerate the distribution of the trust property was merely the
power to affect the timing of the enjoyment by the primary benefi-
ciary who would take, personally or by successors in interest, in
any event.
The Lober Court relied upon the broad statement in Estate of
Holmes that "[a] donor who keeps so strong a hold over the actual
and immediate enjoyment of what he puts beyond his own power
86. 326 U.s. 480 (1946).
87. 346 U.S. 335 (1953).
88. 326 U.S. at 487.
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to retake has not divested himself of that degree of control which
*.. [the forerunner of section 2038] requires in order to avoid the
tax."8' The Court applied this standard to the trust in Lober, con-
cluding that the donor's retained power to affect the timing of ac-
tual possession was a sufficient basis for taxation.'0
The custodial relationship is analogous to the trust in Lober.
The custodian has the same broad discretion to accumulate income
or to distribute income or principal at any time. Prior to termina-
tion of the custodianship, either by distribution of the property or
by passage of time, the donee's death causes the property to pass
to the donee's estate. The Internal Revenue Service in Revenue
Ruling 57-366 takes the position that the rationale of Lober is ap-
plicable in the statutory gift setting. The application seems appro-
priate, since the Lober Court relied upon the retained power to
affect the enjoyment and accelerate the possession of the gift,
without regard to vestedness. This power is also present in the
statutory gift setting.
One commentator has suggested a basis for distinguishing the
statutory gift situation from the trust cases in the above situa-
tion.91 He notes that the donee under the terms of the gift statute
has the vested legal title at all times, while the beneficiary in the
Lober trust situation acquires legal title only at the time of distri-
bution of the property by the trustee. Until this distribution, legal
title rests with the trustee, although the beneficiary has the inde-
feasibly vested equitable title. This difference is not a compelling
basis for different treatment in the estate tax area. As acknowl-
edged by the author of the suggestion, "[a]rguably the minor under
the gift statute has present enjoyment because he has legal title;
but such an analysis seems formalistic since the property may be
preserved and the income accumulated so that the minor receives
no tangible benefits until he reaches twenty-one."' 2
The thrust of Lober is that any retained authority to affect the
timing of actual possession and enjoyment of the transferred prop-
erty makes the transfer "testamentary" and therefore taxable in
the decedent's estate. The same authority concerning the property
89. 346 U.S. at 337 (quoting Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480, 487
(1946)).
90. For a discussion of Lober, see 3 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL Gr AND Es-
TATETAXATION 25.41, at 720-23 (1959). The current Treasury Regulations have adopted
the holding in Lober. Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a) (1958).
91. 69 HARv. L. REv. 1476 (1956).
92. Id. at 1483-84.
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exists on the part of the donor custodian at the time of death prior
to the majority of the donee. It can be maintained, however, that
Lober is an extreme extension of section 2038 and should therefore
be limited, as a matter of policy, to its facts. Indeed, the decision
in Lober has been sharply criticized.93 The Tax Court has stated
that it would resolve the Lober issue in favor of the taxpayer, but
for the Supreme Court's decision in Lober.
If the question involved herein were one of first impression, it might
have been possible to sustain petitioner's position under § 2038. At most, the
power retained by the decedent permitted him merely to shift principal and
income between the life beneficiary and the latter's estate.... It could be
argued that such a limited power in a decedent is not a "power... to...
terminate" within the meaning of § 2038(a)(1) ...
The difficulty is that in Lober v. United States, the Supreme Court faced
the issue ... and held directly against the position taken by the petitioner
herein.' 4
These remarks aside, several courts have sustained the Inter-
nal Revenue Service's ruling9 5 that the Lober rule applies to uni-
form gifts."' While Revenue Ruling 57-366 states generally that the
custodian's powers satisfy the section 2038 test requiring "a power
...to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate," these courts have based
taxation on the custodian's authority to terminate the custodial re-
lationship by paying out the entire principal at any time.
93. Critics have pointed out that the Lober Court relied upon Estate of Holmes with-
out discussing the important difference between the two cases. Estate of Holmes involved
the power to affect the identity of the taker after the transfer; Lober did not. See, e.g., 28
ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 303, 305-06 (1954). The appropriateness of taxing the power to affect
only the timing of enjoyment has been questioned, since the value of the beneficiary's inter-
est arguably remains constant regardless of the time of distribution. See 37 MiNN. L. Rv.
405, 406 (1953).
94. Estate of Varian v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 34 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 396 F.2d
753 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968) (citations omitted). That reasonable jurists
can differ on the Lober issue is suggested also by the fact that prior to the Supreme Court's
decision, the Fifth Circuit decided the issue in favor of the taxpayer in Hay's Estate v.
Commissioner, 181 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1950).
95. Rev. Rul. 57-366, 1957-2 C.B. 618.
96. Zien v. United States, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 12,964 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Eich-
stedt v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 320 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (mistakenly reported as E.D. Cal.); Estate
of Carpousis v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (P-H) 1064 (1974); Estate of Prudowsky v. Com-
missioner, 55 T.C. 890 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 465 F.2d 62 (7th Cir. 1972); Stuit v. Com-
missioner, 54 T.C. 580 (1970), aff'd, 452 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1971); Jacoby v. Commissioner,
39 T.C.M. (P-H) 813 (1970); Estate of Chrysler v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 55 (1965), rev'd on
other grounds, 361 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966).
Prudowsky, Chrysler, Crocker, and Carpousis rely on both § 2038 and § 2036 as the
basis for taxation of the custodial property. Section 2036 is discussed in the text accompa-
nying notes 111-24 infra.
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Taxpayer arguments against the application of section 2038 to
custodianship property have been consistently rejected by the
courts. In Estate of Prudowsky v. Commissioner" the taxpayer
sought to distinguish adverse precedents by establishing that in
this case there was evidence showing that the donee custodian had
no intention to "pay out" the fund during the donee's minority.
Both the Tax Court98 and the Court of Appeals" considered the
taxpayer's subjective intent to be irrelevant.
The taxpayer in Jacoby v. Commissioner0 " attempted to dis-
tinguish Lober. The UGMA provides that a court in certain situa-
tions may order the custodian to pay out income and/or principal
to the minor. 01 Since no similar provision appeared in the terms of
the Lober trust, the discretion of a taxpayer custodian under the
UGMA is arguably less than the discretion of the Lober trustee.
While conceding that this restriction upon the authority to retain
the fund may distinguish the two arrangements, the Tax Court
emphasized that the authority to pay out the whole fund and thus
terminate the arrangement was the same under both the Lober
trust terms and the Jacoby Uniform Act transfer. This authority
to terminate was held a sufficient basis for taxation under section
2038.
Whether the UGMA in fact grants the custodian unfettered
authority to terminate the arrangement was considered in Stuit v.
Commissioner.02 The Uniform Act provides that "[t]he custodian
shall pay over to the minor ... so much of or all the custodial
property as the custodian deems advisable for the support, mainte-
nance, education and benefit of the minor."' 03 The taxpayer in
Stuit argued that this language creates an objective and enforcea-
ble standard limiting the authority of the custodian regarding the
amounts that may be paid out, and thus limiting the power to ter-
minate. The Tax Court concluded that the statutory language is so
97. 55 T.C. 890 (1971), aff'd, 465 F.2d 62 (7th Cir. 1972).
98. 55 T.C. at 893-94.
99. 465 F.2d at 62.
100. 39 T.C.M. (P-H) 813 (1970).
101. Section 4(c) of the UGMA provides,
The court, on the petition of a parent or guardian of the minor or of the minor, if
he has attained the age of fourteen years, may order the custodian to pay over to the
minor for expenditure by him or to expend so much of or all the custodial property as
is necessary for the minor's support, maintenance or education.
This provision is discussed at greater length in the text accompanying notes 25-27 aupra.
102. 54 T.C. 580 (1970), aff'd, 452 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1971).
103. UGMA § 4(b).
524 [Vol. 34:495
broad that it creates no limitation on the authority of the
custodian.""
Attempts have been made to reverse this result under section
2038 by pointing to a perceived inconsistency between taxation
under section 2038 and eligibility for the annual gift tax exclusion.
Section 2503(b) creates a limited exclusion from taxation for trans-
fers of present interests in property. Section 2503(c) states that
certain transfers to minors, despite their characterization for prop-
erty law purposes, shall be considered gifts of present interests for
this specific tax purpose. Revenue rulings in the gift tax area pro-
vide that transfers made pursuant to the Model and Uniform Acts
satisfy the requirements of section 2503(c) and qualify for the sec-
tion 2503(b) exclusion.10 5
It is possible to argue that such treatment of the custodial
fund as a present interest of the minor is fatally inconsistent with
the section 2038 requirement that the beneficiary's enjoyment of
the property be subject to a power in the taxpayer.106 Courts con-
fronted with this argument, however, have rejected it with little
discussion.107 The classification of the interests identified in section
2503(c) as present interests is admittedly an artificial one, created
in order to achieve a single gift tax purpose. The Code evinces no
apparent intent that such arrangements should be treated as if
they confer present enjoyment upon the beneficiary for any other
purpose.
The position of the Internal Revenue Service on the estate
taxability of Model Act transfers was a disappointment to the
Act's drafters.
The Treasury ruling had again discouraged the simplicity of the custo-
dian statute device. The solution to the estate tax difficulty was not complex.
The donor would now merely have his spouse or someone else designated as
custodian. Unfortunately, when transfers had already been made in which the
donor was custodian, the only way to avoid the possible estate tax difficulty
was to have the custodian resign and designate a successor. This required a
court proceeding and, in New York, the possible additional expense of a spe-
cial guardian. What had been originally conceived as a simple substitute for a
trust had become, at least insofar as estate tax consequences were concerned,
a rather intricate procedure.108
Following the enactment of the UGMA in 1956, the Internal
104. 54 T.C. at 583-84. This issue was not discussed in the Seventh Circuit's opinion.
105. Rev. Rul. 56-86, 1956-1 C.B. 449; Rev. RuL 59-357, 1959-2 C.B. 212.
106. See Tenney, supra note 15, at 947-48.
107. Stuit v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 190, 192 (7th Cir. 1971); Estate of Varian v.
Commissioner, 47 T.C. 34, 43 (1966).
108. Newman, supra note 31, at 42.
UGMA1981] 525
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Revenue Service issued Revenue Ruling 59-357,09 extending the
earlier rulings regarding tax consequences under the Model Act to
transfers under the Uniform Act as well. The drafters of the Act
expressed dissatisfaction with the estate tax portion of the ruling:
"In making Rev. Rul. 57-366 applicable to gifts made under the
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, the Internal Revenue Service refused
to recognize that the clear intent of these statutes was to indefea-
sibly vest title in the minor. ' 12°
This "clear intent" of the UGMA framers has been ignored by
some courts as well. Several opinions have relied upon section 2036
as an alternative basis to section 2038 to justify including property
transferred under the UGMA in the gross estate of the donor-par-
ent-custodian taxpayer. This result is possible only because the
courts recognized the possible use of the fund to discharge the pa-
rental support duty.
Generally, section 2036 operates to include in the gross estate
of the decedent taxpayer the value of the property transferred in-
ter vivos by the decedent in which the decedent retains certain in-
terests for a specified period of time."1 The donor of a statutory
gift to a minor, who retains interests in the transferred property
and dies before the minor's majority, has retained the interests
"for a period that does not in fact end before [the donor's] death,"
as required by the statute. The donor's death during the custodi-
anship thus satisfies the timing requirement of the statute. It must
next be determined under what circumstances the retained inter-
ests requirement of section 2036 will be met, so that includibility
in the donor's gross estate results. As discussed below, to the ex-
tent that the taxpayer donor owed a duty of support to the donee,
the property transferred under the UGMA is includible in the
109. 1959-2 C.B. 212.
110. Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the Revised 1966 Uniform Gifts to Minors Act,
8 Uu woRm LAWS ANNOTATD 184 (1972). The criticism is not well reasoned. Given Lober as
precedent, vesting is irrelevant in determining the taxability of a transfer under § 2038.
111. LR.C. § 2036(a) provides,
(a) GENERAL RULE.-The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained
for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any
period which does not in fact end before his death-
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property,
or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the per-
sons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.
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gross estate of the taxpayer if the taxpayer was the custodian at
the time of death.
Section 2036(a)(1) includes transferred property in the gross
estate of the taxpayer if "the possession or enjoyment of, or the
right to the income from, the property" is retained by the donor.
In cases involving trusts, the principle is clearly established that
the transferor who retains an enforceable right to the indirect ben-
efit of the transferred property falls within the provisions of sec-
tion 2036(a)(1). For example, when the trust terms require use of
the trust income to discharge a support duty owed by the donor
taxpayer, section 2036 clearly applies.112 In contrast, when a third
party trustee has discretion regarding the use of transferred prop-
erty for the discharge of a support obligation of the transferor,
there is no inclusion in the gross estate of the donor. Since the
donor cannot force the trustee to distribute funds for the indirect
benefit of the donor, there is no retained enforceable right to any
benefit from the trust.1 2
3
When the donor taxpayer is the trustee with discretion to use
transferred property to discharge a duty of the donor, the author-
ity to use the transferred property at will for the donor's own ben-
efit is a retained right as contemplated by the statute.1 "4 By anal-
ogy, the custodian's discretion under the UGMA to use the fund
for the support of the minor results in taxation only when the tax-
payer donor is, at the time of death, both the custodian and the
parent of the minor. A number of cases have so held.
In Estate of Chrysler v. Commissioner1 5 the Tax Court, upon
finding that the taxpayer had in fact placed securities into custodi-
anship for his daughter, relied on the provision of the New York
law that gave the custodian the discretion to use the fund for the
"support, maintenance, education and benefit of the minor."116
The court concluded that
112. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(2), T.D. 6501, 25 Fed. Reg. 10,869 (1960); D. KAH, E.
COLSON & G. CRAVEN, supra note 64, at 42-43; R. STPHENS, G. MAXPED & S. LmD, FED-
mtAL ESTATE AND Girr TAxA7ON I 4.08(4)(b), at 4-136, S4-19 & n.17 (4th ed. 1978 & Supp.
1980) (collecting cases).
113. D. KAHN, E. COLSON & G. CRAVEN, supra note 64, at 43; 3 J. MERTENS, supra note
90, § 24.13, at 240-44 (Cure. Supp. 1972); R. STEPHENS, G. MAXPIELD & S. LIND, supra note
112, at 4-137, S4-19 & n.19 (collecting cases).
114. D. KAHN, E. COLSON & G. CRAVEN, supra note 64, at 43; 3 J. MERTENS, supra note
90, § 24.12, at 487-88; R. STEPHENS, G. AXFzELD & S. LiND, supra note 112, at 4-136 to 137,
S4-19 & n.21 (collecting cases).
115. 44 T.C. 55 (1965), rev'd on other grounds, 361 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966).
116. 44 T.C. at 68.
UGMA1981]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
under this section the decedent had the right as custodian to apply as much
of the income as he may deem advisable for the support, maintenance, educa-
tion, and benefit of the minor and that, therefore, he had made a transfer
under which he had in effect retained the right to use the income from the
property to discharge his legal obligation to support [his daughter]. We think
such a retained right is sufficient to require the property transferred to be
included in the decedents gross estate under § 2036(a).21 7
Similarly, in Estate of Prudowsky v. Commissioner18 the Tax
Court held that the right of the donor parent to use the fund for
the minor donee's support is a retained "power to apply said assets
in satisfaction of his legal obligation. It follows therefrom that the
value of the transferred assets is includible in the custodian's es-
tate under § 2036."1 9 The taxpayer apparently argued that such a
use of the child's funds for the indirect benefit of the parent would
be illegal under state law. The court rejected this argument, rely-
ing upon the provision of the UGMA that expressly allows this use
and thus distinguishes the arrangement from a common-law gift to
a minor.
1 20
In Eichstedt v. United States'2' the decedent had transferred
property to her minor daughters under the California UGMA, and
had named herself custodian. One daughter married during her mi-
nority and prior to her mother's death. The question arose whether
the marriage of the daughter terminated the support obligation of
the mother under California law. The court, without resolving this
question of emancipation, discussed in dictum the impact of the
daughter's marriage upon includibility under section 2036. If the
obligation of support was ended by the marriage there would be no
includibility. If, on the other hand, the duty to support existed at
the time of the donor's death, then pursuant to the rationale of
Chrysler and Prudowsky the value of the transferred property
would be included in the mother's gross estate under section 2036.
The court ultimately relied upon section 2038 as the basis for tax-
ing the property at decedent's death.1'22
117. Id.
118. 55 T.C. 890 (1971), affld per curiam, 465 F.2d 62 (7th Cir. 1972).
119. 55 T.C. at 894. In Estate of Carpousis v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (P-H) 1064
(1974), the Tax Court held that shares in a mutual fund purchased by the decedent and
registered in his name as custodian for six minor children under the District of Columbia
UGMA were includible in the gross estate under §§ 2036 and 2038. The Court relied upon
Prudowsky as authority for its result.
120. 55 T.C. at 895.
121. 354 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
122. In Crocker-Citizens Natl Bank v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Cal.
1978) (mistakenly reported as E.D. Cal.), the court relied upon its earlier opinion in Eich-
stedt, as well as the Tax Court's opinion in Estate of Prudowsky, as the basis for taxing
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Thus, courts confronted with the situation of the donor-parent
custodian who dies during the minority of the donee while owing a
duty of support have uniformly included the property in the gross
estate under section 2036.
A second theory that supports includibility of custodial prop-
erty in the estate of the donor-parent taxpayer under section 2036
relies upon section 4(c) of the UGMA. That section provides, "The
court, on the petition of a parent... may order the custodian to
pay over to the minor for expenditure by him or to expend so
much of or all the custodial property as is necessary for the minor's
support, maintenance or education."
Under section 2036, the estate of one who transfers property
to another but retains an enforceable right to have some portion of
it used for his or her own benefit is subject to tax on the value of
that portion at death. Whether section 4(c) creates this enforceable
right depends upon one's construction of the statutory language.
Taxation is appropriate only if the statute is read to create a right
in the parent to have the fund used in discharge of the parent's
support duty at the parent's demand and without regard to the
parent's own resources. This interpretation renders the donor's es-
tate taxable in all cases in which the donor is also the parent, re-
gardless of whether the parent is also the custodian. It thus
reaches farther than the "retained power" theory relied upon by
the courts, since the "retained power" theory requires the taxpayer
to wear all three hats before tax liability is incurred. As discussed
earlier in this Article, 122 a more restrictive construction of section
4(c) was probably intended by the drafters. No case law deals with
the rights created by section 4(c). Likewise no courts have relied
upon section 4(c) as the basis for taxation under section 2036.124
Section 2041 has been suggested as a possible basis for includ-
ing custodial property in the estate of a parent who is the custo-
dian at death, but who never owned the property. If the possible
use of the fund by the custodian for the minor's support is ac-
knowledged, the taxpayer parent has the power to appoint the
property for his or her own benefit. Section 2041 includes in the
gross estate property subject to an appointive power in the dece-
custodial property under §§ 2036 and 2038.
123. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
124. This theory is discussed and rejected in Weil & Heald, Uniform Gifts to Minors
Act-Some Second Thoughts on its Usefulness as an Estate Planning Tool, 55 TAXEs 271,
275 (1977). The authors conclude that the necessity to petition and prove need is a limita-
tion on the parents' right that forecloses a determination of taxability.
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dent that was exercisable in favor of the decedent at death. No
case or ruling is reported in which the Internal Revenue Service
has sought to include custodial property in the estate of the dece-
dent-parent custodian under section 2041.125
While alternative bases for the taxation of custodial property
in the estate of one other than the minor have been noted, the
courts have relied upon sections 2036 and 2038. Includibility under
section 2038 relies neither upon the vested interest of the minor
donee nor upon the availability of the fund to discharge parental
support duties under section 4(b) of the UGMA. Includibility
under section 2036, on the other hand, is based upon section 4(b).
When considered in light of the Uniform Act drafters' intent that
the gift property should benefit only the minor donee, section 2036
is a questionable basis for taxation.
V. RESOLVING THE AMBIGUITY IN THE UGMA: THE EFFECT UPON
THE TAX CONSEQUENCES
As indicated above, federal taxing authorities currently rely
upon one definition of custodianship for gift tax purposes and a
different definition for estate and income tax purposes. The two
definitions are derived from two conflicting provisions in the
UGMA-sections 3(a) and 4(b). Eliminating the conflict between
the provisions of the Act, as proposed in this Article, would pro-
duce changes in the tax treatment of uniform gifts. It is appropri-
ate, therefore, to consider the changes that would result if a single
definition of the custodial arrangement were relied upon for all tax
purposes.
A. The Gift Tax
The Internal Revenue Service currently treats all uniform gifts
as completed transfers taxable at the time of creation. This result
is based upon UGMA section 3(a), which states that the legal and
equitable title to the transferred property passes irrevocably to the
minor donee. The question arises whether the gift tax result would
be different if recognition were given to the possible use of the
fund for the support of the donee. Under established principles of
gift tax law, when the support provision of the Act is taken into
account, then in some cases the transfer must be regarded as in-
complete. Thus, not all uniform gifts would be taxable at the time
125. For a discussion of the idea that custodial property might be includible under 5
2041, see Weil & Heald, supra note 124, at 274; 69 HARv. L. RPv. 1476, 1484 (1956).
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of their creation if the Service recognized the interests created by
section 4(b) of the UGMA here, as it does in the estate and income
tax contexts.""6 There are four fact patterns to be analyzed.
First, when the donor is both the parent of the donee and the
custodian, the retained right to discharge the donor's own support
obligation out of the fund renders the transfer incomplete. The
Treasury Regulations provide that "a gift is incomplete in every
instance in which a donor reserves the right to revest the beneficial
title to the property in himself. 1 27 The authority to use the prop-
erty in discharge of the donor's support obligation is clearly such a
right. The transfer of property is incomplete under this analysis
only to the extent of the value of the taxpayer's support duty. To
the extent that the donor transfers property in excess of the
amount owed to the donee as support, the donor cannot subse-
quently use the amount for the donor's own benefit. These excess
amounts are complete gifts to the minor at the time of the
transfer.
Next, when the taxpayer donor is also the custodian, but not
the parent of the donee, the donor retains no beneficial interest in
the custodial fund. The retained power to use the property either
for the benefit of the minor or (indirectly) for the benefit of the
parent, however, renders the transfer incomplete. A donor's failure
to surrender dominion and control over the property, to the extent
that the identity of the beneficial owner remains within the discre-
tion of the donor, removes the transfer from the definition of taxa-
ble gift.1 28 Just as in the first situation considered, when the donor
parent retains a beneficial interest, the transfer is incomplete only
to the extent of the value of the support duty owed by the parent.
To the extent that the value of the transferred property exceeds
that amount, the donor has no authority to pass the benefit of the
property to anyone other than the minor or the minor's estate.12'
126. If both § 3(a) and § 4(b) are taken into consideration, the possibility of double
gift taxation arises. Taxation would take place (under current law) at the time of the initial
transfer. Section 3 provides the basis for such treatment. If, at the time of termination of
the custodianship, attention is focused upon the support provision of the statute, then a
second imposition of the gift tax is possible. When the custodian is also the parent, the
termination of the custodianship can be viewed as the release of a power of appointment
exercisable for the taxpayer's own benefit. Such a release is taxable under IR.C. § 2514. See
69 Hnv. L. Rzv. 1476, 1482-83 (1956).
127. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c), T.D. 7296, 38 Fed. Reg. 34,202 (1973).
128. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939); Tress. Reg. § 25.2511-
2(b), T.D. 7296, 38 Fed. Reg. 34,202 (1973).
129. The authority to affect only the timing of the beneficiary's enjoyment does not
render the transfer incomplete for gift tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(d), T.D. 7296,
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The value belonging exclusively to the minor constitutes a com-
plete and taxable gift.
The third situation occurs when the donor parent transfers
property to a third-party custodian. Here, the custodian has the
power to use the property for the benefit of the donor to the extent
of the value of the support obligation. In the analogous area of
trust taxation, this power may render the gift incomplete. The
Treasury Regulations'"0 state that when a third party trustee must
distribute income to the donor pursuant to an ascertainable and
enforceable standard, the gift is incomplete to the extent of the
value of the enforceable interest of the donor. A purely discretion-
ary power in the third party does not affect the completeness of
the gift.
This rule is consistent with the more general rule enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Robinette v. Helvering.31 In Robinette
the Court declined to reduce the amount of a taxable gift by the
value of the settlor's retained reversionary interest. Since the tax-
payer failed to demonstrate the value of the reversion, the Court
concluded that the entire value of the property transferred was
subject to tax. The third-party power is regarded as a retained in-
terest and is therefore not taxable as a gift if its value is ascertain-
able by virtue of an enforceable standard that preserves rights to
the transferred property in the donor.
The broad discretion conferred upon the custodian by section
4(b) of the UGMA is clearly inconsistent with the existence of any
enforceable right in the parent regarding the use of the fund for
the child's support. Similarly, it seems unlikely that the language
of section 4(c), which creates the parent's right to petition for dis-
tribution, would be construed as creating an enforceable right in
the parent capable of valuation.13 2 Sections 4(b) and 4(c) seem to
create no bar to imposing the gift tax on a transfer that utilizes a
third-party custodian.
38 Fed. Reg. 34,202 (1973).
130. Id. at § 25.2511-2(b).
131. 318 U.S. 184 (1943).
132. In Ellis v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 182 (1968), the taxpayer transferred property to
a trustee that could pay out income, in its discretion, for the "care, comfort and support" of
taxpayer's wife. Taxpayer urged an alternative rationale to the enforceable standard theory
as a rationale for finding the gift to be partially incomplete. Taxpayer argued that his own
ability to withhold support from the beneficiary forced the trustee to exercise its discretion
and pay out income for her support, thereby constituting retained dominion and control
over the transferred property. The court rejected the theory, holding that such "control" is
not sufficient to render the gift of the life estate incomplete. Id. at 187.
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In the analogous trust area, even in cases in which the discre-
tion of the trustee appears to be absolute, the transfer may not be
deemed complete. If the trustee's power to use property for the
benefit of the donor creates rights to the property in the creditors
of the donor under local law, the transfer is incomplete. The ration-
ale is that since the donor retains the power to incur debts result-
ing in possible creditor access to the fund, the donor retains con-
trol and dominion.133 Unless it could be established that the credi-
tors of a particular donor parent had access to the custodial fund,
this rule, developed in the trust setting, would have no impact
upon the completeness of transfers under the UGMA.
Beyond the situations in which the donor can compel distribu-
tion of an ascertainable portion of the transferred property or the
donor's creditors can reach the assets, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice now takes the position that the discretionary power in a third
party to use the property for the benefit of the donor does not
prevent the transfer from being a completed gift.'" The Service
has not always maintained this position. In Revenue Ruling 54-
538135 the Service approved the holding of Gramm v. Commis-
sioner,136 a case in which the Tax Court seemed to veer from the
general principles discussed above.13 7 Subsequently, in Revenue
Ruling 62-13 1 8 the Service seemed to support an even larger ex-
ception to the general principle of Robinette for this third-party
power situation. The later ruling appeared to shift to the Commis-
sioner the burden of proving the value of interests conferred upon
persons other than the grantor before the tax would be imposed.1s'
133. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Vander Weele, 254 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1958).
134. Rev. Rul. 77-378, 1977-2 C.B. 348.
135. 1954-2 C.B. 316.
136. 17 T.C. 1063 (1951).
137. In Gramm the settlor taxpayer created a trust, reserving a life income interest in
herself and empowering the trustees to invade the principal for her comfort, education,
maintenance, or support. Because of the relatively small size of the corpus ($83,000), the
"unlimited possibility of withdrawal," and the likelihood that such withdrawals would be
made, the court held that the settlor did not make a completed gift of the remainder.
In Rev. Rul. 54-538, 1954-2 C.B. 316, the Internal Revenue Service attempted to recon-
cile Gramm with Robinette by limiting the former strictly to its facts-i.e., "the small
amount of corpus and the resulting small annual income, [making] substantial invasion of
the corpus ... very probable. . . ." Id. at 317. Had it not been for those "unusual and
particular facts," the Service implied, the taxpayer in Gramm would have been required to
establish the value of her reversion before being allowed to escape gift tax thereon.
138. 1962-1 C.B. 181.
139. In the 1962 ruling, advice was requested by a taxpayer who had transferred a
substantial amount of property into trust, giving the trustee broad discretion in distributing
income and corpus to the taxpayer. It was held that since "there appears to be no assurance
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Fifteen years later, in Revenue Ruling 77-378 the Service reached
its current position in this area. In the 1977 pronouncement, the
Service held that the result in Revenue Ruling 62-13 would apply
only when the settlor's creditors could reach the fund or when the
settlor could compel distribution to himself or herself in accor-
dance with an ascertainable standard.
To summarize this area of third-party powers, it appears that
when the donor parent names someone else custodian, the gift will
be considered complete and therefore taxable if certain assump-
tions can be made. First, one must assume that the language of
neither section 4(b) nor section 4(c) of the UGMA creates an en-
forceable right in the parent. Second, the creditors of the parent
must not have access to the custodial fund. Last, the facts of the
particular case must be distinguishable from those that produced
the aberrational result in the Gramm case. 140
The fourth and final situation to be considered is when the
donor is neither the custodian nor the parent of the donee. In this
context, recognition of the custodian's power to use the fund for
the minor's support has no effect on the determination of whether
the transfer is a complete gift when made. The donor clearly has
retained no control and no beneficial interest in the property, re-
gardless of whether the fund can be used for support.
When section 4(b) of the UGMA is taken into consideration,
no gift tax consequences occur at the time of the transfer in the
first and second situations above. In all cases in which the donor is
also the custodian, the gift tax would be imposed at the time of
actual distribution by the custodian. If the donor custodian is also
the parent, the gift tax would be imposed at the time of those dis-
tributions to the minor donee that do not in fact relieve the par-
ent's legal duty to furnish support. When the donor custodian is
not the parent, the tax would be imposed at the time of any distri-
bution. This result differs, of course, from the current treatment of
at the time of creating the trust that anything of value will be paid to a beneficiary...
other than the grantor, such transfer constitutes, for purposes of the Federal gift tax stat-
ute, an incomplete transfer and, hence, does not result in a taxable gift." The Service fur-
ther explained that the Robinette rule concerning the taxpayers' burden to prove value "is
considered applicable only to cases where it has already been determined that a gift has
been made and the issue concerns the valuation of an interest retained by the donor ...
Id. at 182.
140. Regarding the area of third-party powers generally, see Lowndes, Some Doubts
About the Use of Trusts to Avoid the Estate Tax, 47 MINN. L. REV. 31, 42-52 (1962); Mac-
ris, Open Valuation and the Completed Transfer: A Problem Area in Federal Gift Taxa-
tion, 34 TAx. L. Rv. 273, 285-90 (1979).
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statutory gifts by the Internal Revenue Service. The Service pres-
ently ignores the possible use of the fund for the minor's support.
When that possible use is ignored, the gift is properly taxed at the
time of the transfer.
B. The Income Tax
Income tax provisions currently contemplate the possible use
of income from the custodial fund for the minor's support pursu-
ant to section 4(b) of the UGMA. Revenue Ruling 56-484141 states
that the income used in this way should be taxed to the parent.
This result would be different if reliance were placed instead upon
section 3(a) of the UGMA, which states that title is indefeasibly
vested in the minor. If one relies on section 3(a), diversion of in-
come to the parent is not legally possible under the UGMA any
more than it is possible when an outright gift is made. Total liabil-
ity for income tax purposes would then rest with the minor donee.
C. The Estate Tax
Custodial property has been included in the estate of the do-
nor decedent under section 2036 based on the retained right to use
the fund in discharge of the donor's support obligation. This is in-
consistent, of course, with the UGMA section 3(a) theory that the
transfer creates total ownership in the minor to the exclusion of
any retained interest in the transferor. If reliance were placed upon
the latter view of the transaction instead of the former, estate tax-
ation under section 2036 would be foreclosed. Of course, section
2038 provides an alternative basis for taxation that depends not
upon any interest retained by the taxpayer, but rather upon the
authority retained by every custodian taxpayer to affect the timing
of the donee's enjoyment. Taxability under section 2038, therefore,
is unaffected by the ambiguity that exists in the UGMA. In every
case in which section 2036 applies to a uniform gift, section 2038
also applies. Although section 2036 applies only in situations in
which the donor is also the custodian and the parent of the donee,
section 2038 reaches all cases in which the donor is also the custo-
dian, Since the power of the custodian taxpayer extends over the
entire principal as well as income, the amount includible in the
gross estate under section 2038 will be the value of the corpus plus
accumulated income at the date of death. The amount includible
141. 1956-2 C.B. 23.
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under section 2036 will be limited by the value of the support obli-
gation owed by the decedent to the minor donee at the time of
death. No lesser amount, therefore, would ever be includible under
section 2038 than would be includible under section 2036. Thus,
shifting to the gift tax perception of the uniform gift will not affect
the estate taxability of the arrangement, but will affect only the
Code section and the theory upon which one relies.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current treatment of uniform gifts as creating interests in
only one person for gift tax purposes, and as creating interests in
others as well for income and estate tax purposes, is inappropriate.
Resolution of the underlying ambiguity within the Uniform Gifts
to Minors Act would produce a more uniform tax treatment. If sec-
tion 4(b) were modified to state clearly that the custodian is not
empowered to use the fund to discharge parental support duties,
no change would occur in the gift tax treatment. Income tax liabil-
ity would be incurred by only the minor donee, the result presuma-
bly desired by most donors. Situations in which the estate tax is
imposed would remain unchanged, but different Code authority
would apply. On the other hand, if section 3(a) were modified to
limit expressly the interest of the minor in the custodial fund by
recognizing the interest in the parent, only the gift tax treatment
would be affected.
The framers of the UGMA intended to facilitate the convey-
ance of property to minor donees by creating the custodial rela-
tionship. Eliminating the custodian's authority to use the uniform
gift fund to discharge parental duties to support the minor donee
would be consistent with this general purpose. Clarifying section
4(b) to allow use of the fund only for the benefit of the minor do-
nee would produce changes in the income and estate taxation of
custodial property that are reconcilable with the current gift tax
treatment of uniform gifts.
Outside the area of federal taxation, the ambiguity in the Uni-
form Act regarding the availability of custodial funds for the sup-
port of the minor donee has generated uncertainty and needless
litigation centered around the ownership of UGMA property. Sec-
tion 3(a) indicates that only the minor donee has an interest, while
section 4(b) indicates that both the minor and the minor's parents
have interests in the custodial fund. Resolution of this ambiguity,
by amending section 4(b) in the manner proposed in this Article,
would introduce a desirable element of certainty to the custodial
relationship created by the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act.
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